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CASES NOTED
one further question remains. Certainly, both parties' predecessors in title
had knowledge of the situation at the time the common wall was created.
The question then becomes whether the knowledge of the original prede-
cessors in title has any effect on the present parties to the litigation, who
had no knowledge of the existence of the common wall. This question
was not explored by the court in its opinion.
To resolve this question, Harrison v. Union National Bank 8 might be
considered. In Harrison, on the basis of facts strikingly similar to those
in the noted case, the court held that when a person builds a wall wholly
upon his own land and permits the adjoining owner to support his floor
beams in the wall, if the successors in title of the owner of the land upon
which the wall stood have no notice or knowledge of the support given,
the adjoining owner cannot acquire an easement for such support by any
lapse of time. Thus, it appears that even if the original predecessors in
title to the common wall had knowledge of the situation, the decision in
Esquire Estates, Inc. v. Krakow 9 that there was no prescriptive easement
is sound.
In the opinion of this writer, the court had a unique opportunity
to delineate the law of party walls in Florida. The court utilized this oc-
casion to establish a general rule of law, which has been previously ac-
cepted in most other jurisdictions. In addition, the court properly applied
this rule of law to the facts of this case. Although a different result could
have been reached by imputing knowledge of the existence of the party
wall to the defendant in the instant case, it is submitted that the result
reached by the court is a more rational solution to the problem than a
solution based on imputed knowledge.
MARK S. BERMAN
PROTECTING THE LIVES AND LIMBS OF PUBLIC INVITEES-
NEW LIABILITY FOR FLORIDA LAND OWNERS?
Defendant, an honorary member of the Garden Club of Palm Beach,
gratuitously allowed her estate to be included in a club money-raising
tour of show place homes. Plaintiff, who had paid a five dollar tour fee to
the Garden Club, tripped on a piece of vinyl material protecting the De-
fendant's rugs and fractured her hip while on the tour. The jury, having
been instructed that the plaintiff was a licensee, returned a verdict upon
which judgment was entered for the defendant. On appeal to the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held, reversed and remanded: The
"mutual economic benefit" test adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
18. 22 Pa. County Ct. 562 (1899), aff'd, 13 Pa. Super. 274 (1900).
19. 249 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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in McNulty v. Hurley' for determining whether one is an invitee should
be supplemented by the addition of the "public invitation" test 2 under
which the plaintiff qualifies as an invitee. Lunney v. Post, 248 So.2d 504
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).8
Traditionally, persons entering the property of another have been
classified as trespassers, licensees, or invitees.1 The duty required of the
land occupier to protect the entrant from harm suffered by reason of de-
fects on the premises varies according to the entrant's status. Generally,
the land occupier is liable only for willful misconduct or wanton negligence
resulting in injury when the entrant is a trespasser." On the other hand,
the occupier of land has a duty to refrain from intentionally exposing a
licensee to danger and to warn him of known latent dangers which he
might reasonably be expected to encounter.6 Respecting invitees, to whom
the landowner owes the greatest duty, the premises must be in a reason-
ably safe condition and devoid of dangers of which the land occupier
actually knows or reasonably should know.7 While most jurisdictions ex-
tend duties corresponding to such classifications,' there is great conflict of
opinion as to just who is to be accorded invitee status.9
In 1934, the Restatement of Torts adopted the "economic benefit"
theory as the exclusive test to determine entitlement to the protection af-
forded by invitee status. 10 This theory equated the term invitee with
"business visitor;"' "1 i.e., one who entered the premises for the mutual
economic benefit of himself and the land occupier. 2 Professor Bohlen, the
leading advocate of the mutual economic benefit theory,'3 based its
validity upon the proposition that people owed affirmative duties to others
1. 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965); Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d
508 (1970) ; Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 992 (1964).
3. The Fourth District certified the question of whether the public invitation test
should be adopted in Florida as one of great public interest on May 18, 1971. The court held
further that, if the public invitation test was unacceptable, the plaintiff qualified as an
invitee under the mutual economic benefit test.
4. See 2 F. HARPER and F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1430 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES]; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 357 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER, TORTS].
5. See, e.g., Byers v. Gunn, 81 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1953).
6. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Straus, 43 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1950).
7. See, e.g., First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1950).
8. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 1435, 1470, 1478.
9. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 4, at 386; compare Prosser, Business Visitors And In-
vitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Prosser] with Bohlen, The Basis
of Affirmative Obligations In The Law of Tort, 53 PA. L. REv. 209, 273, 337 (1905) [here-
inafter cited as Bohlen].
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934).
§ 332. Business Visitor Defined.
A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain
on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected
with business dealings between them.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Bohlen, supra note 9.
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only in return for some consideration or benefit. 4 The Florida position
previously enunciated by the Supreme Court of Florida, espoused the
position of the First Restatement.' 5
In determining this question [whether one is a business in-
vitee] the general test is whether the injured person, at the time
of the injury, had present business relations with the owner of
the premises which would render his presence of mutual aid to
both, or whether his presence on the premises was for his own
convenience, or on business with others than the owner of the
premises. In the absence of some relation which inures to the
mutual benefit of the two, or to that of the owner, no invitation
can be implied, and the injured person must be regarded as a
mere licensee.16
In opposition to the First Restatement and Professor Bohlen, an-
other school argued that the economic benefit theory should not be the
exclusive determining factor of invitee status. 7 William Prosser, the
leader of this second group, made an exhaustive study of early case
law'8 and deduced that the prior theory of the land occupier's duty to
invitees was
not [based upon] any economic benefit to the occupier, but a
representation to be implied when he encourages others to enter
to further a purpose of his own, that reasonable care has been
exercised to make the place safe for those who come for that
purpose. 19
Prosser concluded:
When premises are thrown open to the public, the occupier
assumes responsibility for their safe condition toward any
member of the public who may enter for the purpose for
which they are open, regardless of whether he brings with him
the hope of profit or "benefit." 20
Responding to this argument and similar arguments, the majority of
American jurisdictions 21 and the American Law Institute22 adopted the
14. Id.
15. McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
16. id. at 188, quoting from Cowart v. Meeks, 131 Tex. 36, 111 S.W.2d 1105 (1938)
(emphasis in original).
17. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed To Licensees And
Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954) ; Prosser, supra note 9.
18. Prosser, supra note 9.
19. PRoSSER, TORTS, supra note 4, at 388.
20. Prosser, supra note 9, at 611-12.
21. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 4. at 389.
22. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).§ 332. Invitee Defined.(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land..as..
a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
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view that a public invitee as well as a business visitor is entitled to the
protection of invitee status. Apparently influenced by this authority,"
the Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, said in the instant
case:
The adoption of the invitation theory as expressed in the
Second Restatement of Torts is more reasonable, realistic and
as this case so ably demonstrates, more just."
A major contemporary objection to the inclusion of the public invita-
tion test in Florida is proferred by Judge Reed who dissented in the in-
stant case. Judge Reed decries what, in his view, is "a headlong rush
to extend financial liability to every injured person who presents an ap-
pealing claim."2 5 It has been pointed out, however, that the scope of the
public invitation may be strictly limited to those to whom an "invitation"
was actually extended by the land occupier.26 Such a restricted interpre-
tation would eliminate "loiterers, and those who come in only to get out
of the weather; ...spectators and sightseers who are not in any way
encouraged to come."2" Others who, in the absence of a public invitation,
pursue strictly their own business would also be excluded.
Whether adoption of the public invitation test in Florida would sub-
stantially change the outcome of many cases is questionable. Florida
courts, faced with inequitable results in strictly applying the economic
benefit test, have stretched the definition of mutual economic benefit be-
yond reasonable bounds. They have, for example, found a mutual eco-
nomic benefit between such unlikely persons as a store owner and an
infant accompanying his brother to play in a store playground 2 and a
hospital and the visitor of one of its patients.29 Only two types of Florida
cases have, in fact, been found in which the holding would have differed
had the public invitation test been in effect.8 0 In one class of cases, the
plaintiff was injured while traveling on a private way which had the
for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land.
Id.
23. It should be noted that the only Florida case cited by the Fourth District as author-
ity was Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 232 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), which the
Fourth District, itself, had decided a year earlier. It can be concluded that the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal is, at this moment, Florida's leading advocate of the public invitation
test.
24. Lunney v. Post, 248 So.2d 504, 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
25. Id. at 510 (dissenting opinion).
26. Prosser, supra note 9, at 596.
27. Id.
28. Jackson v. Pike, 87 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1956).
29. North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Adams, 143 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); see also
Sandford v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 139 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (plaintiff
diverted into defendant's gas station because defendant blocked sidewalk; held to be an
"implied" invitee). In the principle case the court was able to find a commercial benefit for
the defendant even though she gratuitously donated her home for the Garden Club tour.
30. See PRossnR, TORTS, supra note 4, at 389, 390, for similar cases arising in other
jurisdictions.
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appearance of a public thoroughfare.3 In the other class of cases, per-
sons were injured while attending religious services or meetings3 2 The
acceptance of the public invitation test would, therefore, extend liability
in only a limited sphere, while making it possible for Florida courts to
avoid creating mutual economic benefit by what amounts to fictitious
means.
Great emphasis in American negligence jurisprudence is placed upon
the ever-present concept of the reasonable man. The general rule is, of
course, that one must exercise the care of a reasonable man to avoid in-
juring others by his actions. The rule that a land occupier's duty varies
with the entrant's classification is a departure from the general "reason-
able man" rule. The departure stems, no doubt, from the same considera-
tions which placed the value of land above that of human life during the
development of common law.3 In place of such considerations, we have
today an increasing regard for human safety, increasingly crowded living
conditions, greater availability of insurance, and a general sense of moral-
ity that militates against an exceptional liability rule for land occupiers.
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of pro-
tection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under
the law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission or with permission but without a business purpose.
Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct de-
pending upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the
injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to de-
termine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care,
is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian
values.3 4
It is therefore submitted that the public invitee should not only enjoy
invitee status, but also that a land owner should be liable for any devia-
tion from his duty to use reasonable care, regardless of the entrant's
status.35
RODNEY W. BRYSON
31. Tims v. Orange State Oil Co., 161 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (plaintiff was
injured when her car collided with defendant's grease rack. The rack was left on what
looked like a public way, but was actually defendant's property. The court held that since
plaintiff did not enter for the purpose of conducting business with the defendant, she was
a mere licensee).
32. McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957) (churchgoer a mere licensee); Broad-
street Christian Church v. Carrington, 234 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Maxymow v.
Lake Maggiore Baptist Church, 212 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
33. See H PE & JAMES, supra note 4, at 1432.
34. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
104 (1968).
35. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
1971]
